We analyze the implications of short-selling and margin purchase constraints for management compensation and portfolio optimization under moral hazard. First, looking at the manager's problem, we show that her active portfolio (that is, net of the benchmark) will not be independent of the benchmark design. We solve analytically for the benchmark composition that maximizes e¤ort expenditure. Analyzing the principal's optimal contract, we show that, under portfolio constraints, relative performance evaluation may be optimal. Numerically, we solve jointly for the manager's incentive fee and the optimal benchmark. There exists a tradeo¤ between adverse risk-incentives (as pointed out in Roll (1992)) and sharpening the manager's incentives in the search for more accurate (hence, pro…table) information. When the benchmark composition is endogenoulsy determined, the principal's optimal benchmark choice will not necessarily coincide with the benchmark that maximizes the fund's Information Ratio (excess return per unit of tracking error volatility). Deviations from the optimal contract are shown to be quantitatively onerous for the principal's welfare, depending among other parameters, on both the principal and the manager's risk aversion. Finally, the model yields a set of novel testable implications for mutual fund performance under portfolio constraints.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the e¤ect of relative (to a benchmark) performance evaluation on the provision of incentives for the search of private information under moral hazard. Managers are exogenously constrained in their ability to sell short and purchase on margin. We solve the principal's optimal contract, including the benchmark composition and the optimal performancelinked incentive fee.
Portfolio constraints have been typically overlooked in the literature. This paper shows that they have important implications in management compensation and portfolio optimization.
First, looking at the manager's problem, we show that her active portfolio (that is, net of the benchmark) will not be independent of the benchmark design. We solve analytically for the benchmark composition that maximizes e¤ort. Analyzing the principal's optimal contract, we show that, under portfolio constraints, relative performance evaluation may be optimal.
Numerically, we solve jointly for the manager's incentive fee and the optimal benchmark. There exists a trade-o¤ between adverse risk-incentives (as pointed out in Roll (1992) ) and sharpening the manager's incentives in the search for more accurate (hence, pro…table) information. When the benchmark composition is endogenoulsy determined, the principal's optimal benchmark choice will not necessarily coincide with the benchmark that maximizes the fund's Information Ratio. Deviations from the optimal contract are shown to be quantitatively onerous for the principal's welfare depending, among other parameters, on the principal's and the manager's risk aversion. Finally, the model yields a set of novel testable implications for mutual fund performance under portfolio constraints.
We propose a simple two-period, two-asset (the market and a risk-less bond) model. We call the principal the investor who plays the role of a fund's CIO or board. The compensation contract is signed between the fund's CIO and the portfolio manager. This contract is typically unobservable. The compensation package includes a ‡at fee and a performance-tied incentive fee, possibly benchmarked to a given portfolio return. Both the incentive fee and the benchmark composition are determined endogenously. In our model, the manager's incentives are explicit: they arise from the design of the optimal compensation contract. 1 With the exception of Gómez and Sharma (2006) , the extant literature on fund management compensation assumes that the manager is unrestricted in her portfolio choice. However, in practice, fund managers face various portfolio constraints. For example, Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004) document that approximately 70% of mutual funds explicitly state (in Form N-SAR submitted to the SEC) that short-selling is not permitted. This …gure rises to above 90% when the restriction is on margin purchases. Surprisingly, given the widespread existence of constraints, the literature has not addressed the implication of such constraints on 1 In the model, the fund's net asset value is given. Both the ‡at fee and the incentive fee are proportional to the funds net asset value. We abstract from the implicit incentives arising from the convex ‡ow-performance relation documented in the literature (see, for instance, Gruber (1996) , Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Del Guercio and Tkac (2000) and Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2007) ). fund manager's incentives. 2 A number of new insights arise after introducing portfolio constraints. First, looking at the manager's e¤ort and portfolio choice problem, we show that the active portfolio and e¤ort decisions (hence, performance) depend on both the incentive fee and the benchmark composition. The relationship between the manager's e¤ort and the incentive fee has been documented by Gómez and Sharma (2006) . The relationship between the e¤ort decision and the benchmark composition, however, contrasts with the well-known "irrelevance result" in Admati and P ‡eiderer (1997) : the manager's e¤ort is independent of the benchmark composition; it only depends on the manager's e¤ort disutility. We derive explicitly the e¤ort maximizing benchmark's composition as a function of the market moments, the portfolio constraints, and the manager's risk-aversion coe¢ cient. The irrelevance result in Admati and P ‡eiderer (1997) arises only in the limit, when the portfolio constraints vanish.
To understand the model's intuition, consider a manager who is totally constrained in her ability to sell short and purchase at margin. Under moral hazard, the manager's optimal portfolio can be decomposed in two components: her unconditional risk-diversi…cation portfolio plus her active or "timing" portfolio. 3 The timing portfolio depends on the manager's costly e¤ort to improve her timing ability through superior information. For a uninformed manager, this portfolio would be zero. For a hypothetical perfectly informed manager, it would push the optimal total portfolio to either boundary: 100% in the risky asset if the market risk premium is forecasted to be positive; 100% in the bond otherwise. Now, assume that the unconditional portfolio consists of 30% invested in the risky market portfolio. For this perfectly informed manager, any timing portfolio that involves shorting the market by more than 30% or investing more than 70% in the market will hit the portfolio boundaries. Anticipating this and taking into account e¤ort disutility, the manager will decide the optimal e¤ort expenditure.
Imagine now that the same manager is given a benchmarked contract. The benchmark consists of 20% in the market portfolio and 80% in the bond. The manager adjusts her optimal portfolio. Relative to the benchmark, the unconditional optimal portfolio is still 30% long in the market. The manager has to beat the benchmark for the incentive fee to kick in. Therefore, her total market investment will be now 50% of her portfolio: 20% to replicate the benchmark plus the optimal risk-diversi…cation 30%. Holding the portfolio constraints constant, this implies that if the market premium is predicted to be negative, the manager's timing portfolio can now go short up to 50% in the market, 20% more than in the absence of the benchmark. This will increase the manager's utility from e¤ort, thereby improving the incentives for sharpening her timing ability. At the same time, if the market premium is predicted to be positive, the manager's timing portfolio can go long in the market only 50%, 20% less than before the benchmark was introduced. This has the opposite e¤ect on the e¤ort inducement: the manager will have less incentives to exert costly e¤ort. Taking into account this trade-o¤, the benchmark 2 Portfolio constraints have been discussed in the literature in other contexts. For example, Almazán et al. (2004) present evidence that portfolio constraints are devices to monitor the manager's e¤ort. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Brown et al. (1996) argue that cross-sectional di¤erences in constraint adoption might be related to characteristics that proxy for managerial risk aversion.
3 Since the manager needs to optimally choose between a well-diversi…ed market portfolio and the risk free asset, active management in our model is analogous to timing ability. Hence, we use the two terms interchangeably.
is chosen such that the manager's unconditional portfolio (benchmark replication plus optimal risk-return trade-o¤) is equally distant from both portfolio boundaries. Such a benchmark would provide the manager with the highest incentives for e¤ort exertion. The intuition is simple: such a benchmark leaves the manager marginally indi¤erent between hitting the short-selling or the margin purchase constraint. When the portfolio space is unconstrained, so is the timing portfolio.
Benchmarking the manager's incentive fee fails to provide any incentive for e¤ort expenditure.
Turning to the investor's problem, he has to decide the benchmark composition and the fee structure. We obtain two conclusion. First, we show that in the absence of moral hazard between the investor and the fund manager, the optimal incentive fee coincides with the Pareto-e¢ cient risk allocation fee. In addition, we show that the optimal benchmark is the risk-free asset. This is not totally surprising: in the absence of moral hazard, the manager's e¤ort is independent of the incentive fee and the benchmark composition. The only role for the incentive fee is to split the risk between the investor (the principal) and the manager (the agent). Hence, the …rst best split remains optimal. As for the benchmark, any deviation from the risk-free asset (uncorrelated with the market portfolio) will distort the principals optimal portfolio and induce the manager to take excessive risk above the investor's risk preference (Roll (1992) ). This result extends the unconstrained contract of Adamati and P ‡eiderer (1997) into the constrained scenario: with or without constraints, the investor's optimal benchmark when e¤ort is publicly observable is the minimum-variance portfolio (in this case, the risk free asset).
This does not necessarily hold in the presence of moral hazard between the investor and the manager. Under portfolio constrains and moral hazard, the manager's e¤ort depends on the incentive fee and the benchmark composition. On the one hand, increasing the incentive fee gives the manager more incentives to improve her timing ability (by putting more e¤ort); the downside is that the compensation becomes more onerous for the investor. With respect to the benchmark, the risk free asset may not be optimal anymore: making the benchmark more risky may induce higher e¤ort on the manager. On the other hand, any benchmark other than the risk-free asset will a¤ect the investor's optimal risk-return trade-o¤. Moreover, these double trade-o¤ considerations (for the incentive fee as well as for the benchmark composition), are interrelated.
We show analytically that, in presence of moral hazard and portfolio constraints, the incentive fee contract under no moral hazard is not optimal. Numerical results show that the optimal incentive fee is higher than in the no moral hazard case. Moreover, contrary to the unconstrained case in Adamati and P ‡eiderer (1997) , the optimal benchmark is di¤erent from the risk-free asset and varies with the portfolio constraints. More concretely, the optimal benchmark proportion invested in the market increases with the managers risk aversion and decreases with the investor's risk aversion. On the other side, providing e¤ort incentives is not the only concern for the investor. Given the benchmark portfolio, the manager will maximize the excess relative return while reducing the tracking error volatility. In other words, the manager will try to maximize the fund's Information Ratio. This comes, however, at the expense of exposing the investor to higher total risk. We show that when the benchmark composition is endogenoulsy determined, maximizing the fund's Information Ratio (relative excess return per unit of tracking error) is generally suboptimal for the principal. In other words, the principal's optimal benchmark choice will not necessarily coincide with the benchmark that maximizes the fund's Information Ratio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next we review the related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. The standard unconstrained results are refreshed in Section 3.1. The e¤ect of portfolio constraints are analyzed in section 3.2. In section 4, we derive the composition of the e¤ort-maximizing benchmark portfolio. Section 5 studies the principal's problem. A numerical solution to the constrained manager's e¤ort is presented in Section 6. Section ??
analyzes the model's empirical implications. The paper concludes with Section 7. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Related Literature
The design of fund management compensation schemes has elicited interest amongst both practitioners and researchers. The focus of the academic literature has been on how incentives a¤ect performance and risk-taking behavior of managers. A number of theoretical papers have studied the e¤ect of a performance-related incentive fee on managers'incentive to search for private information (see, for example, Bhattacharya and P ‡eiderer (1985) , Stoughton (1993) , Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) and Gómez and Sharma (2006) ). Another strand of literature addresses issues related to the design of incentive fee. Adamati and P ‡eiderer (1997) and Dybvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2001) , among others, have discussed the convenience of absolute versus relative (benchmarked to a given portfolio) incentive fees. 4 With respect to risk, Roll (1992) was the …rst to illustrate the undesirable e¤ect of relative (i.e., benchmarked) portfolio optimization in a partial equilibrium, single-period model. In particular, he shows that the manager's active portfolio is independent of the benchmark composition and that this leads the manager to take systematically more risk than the benchmark.
Despite the sub-optimal risk allocation, the portfolio optimization literature takes as given that the manager minimizes tracking error volatility subject to an excess return and studies how di¤erent constraints on the portfolio's total risk (Roll (1992) ), tracking error (Jorion (2003) ), and Value-at-Risk (VaR) (Alexander and Baptista (2006) ), may help to reduce excessive risk taking. Bajeux et al (2007) study the interaction between tracking error and portfolio weights constraints. Interestingly, Jorion (2003) writes (footnote 7, page 82) that "in practice, the active positions will depend on the benchmark if the mandate has short-selling restrictions on total weights." Our model formalizes this intuition and shows that, in the presence of portfolio constraints, the manager's active portfolio depends on the benchmark composition. More importantly, for the constrained manager, the tracking-error minimization mandate arises endogenously through the manager's relative incentive fee.
In a dynamic setting, Basak, Shapiro, and Tepla (2006) study the optimal policies of an agent subject to a benchmarking restriction. Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2006) analyze the e¤ect of an exogenous benchmark restriction on the manager's risk-taking behavior. Their model shows that an exogenous benchmark restriction may ameliorate the adverse risk incentives induced by the manager's compensation as a proportion of the fund's net asset value (implicitly linked to the fund's performance). In a multi-manager portfolio delegation problem, Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2007) show that benchmarking the managers payo¤s may help to align the interest of the investor and the managers for risk diversi…cation, risk sharing and investment horizons.
However, they do not study the optimal benchmark composition for e¤ort inducement: in their model, the manager's timing ability is exogenously given. Brennan (1993) , Gómez and Zapatero (2003) and Cuoco and Kaniel (2006) study the asset pricing implications of relative incentive fees.
The model has readily testable empirical implications and, in this regard, our paper is related to the literature on mutual fund performance evaluation. Golec (1992) and Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) document that the number of mutual funds that explicitly use incentive fees is relatively small in comparison with the pervasive use of a " ‡at" fee (a …xed percentage of the fund's net asset value). 5 Further, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) …nd that funds which use incentive fees have superior performance relative to those that do not. In their conclusions, they claim that "while at this time funds with incentive fees seem to o¤er superior performance relative to other actively managed funds, we don't know whether this is true because of the motivation supplied by incentive fees or because skilled managers adopt incentive fees to advertise their skills to the public." Our model shows that under portfolio constraints and moral hazard, portfolio managers who are o¤ered a benchmarked incentive fee are more motivated than equally skilled managers whose compensation is not performance-linked.
In a related paper, Becker et al. (1999) test for market timing ability and benchmarking.
However, in their empirical model, the manager faces no portfolio constraints. According to our results, in such a setting, the optimal benchmark is the risk free asset (e¤ectively, no benchmarking). Consistent with this, they …nd no support for the use of benchmarks in an unconditional setting. However, after conditioning for public information, they …nd an economic meaningful estimate for benchmarking, albeit the overall performance of the model remains quite poor. The empirical implications of our model o¤er guidance on how to extend the tests in Becker et al. (1999) into a framework that accounts explicitly for the presence of short selling and margin purchase constraints, prevalent across the mutual fund industry.
The model
A typical fund sponsor will inform the customer that managers (who are involved in investment research) are responsible for choosing each fund's investments. Customers are also informed about how the advisory management company (responsible for choosing and monitoring the managers) is compensated. This is known as the advisory fee. Customers typically ignore how managers are compensated. Given this information, the customer decides how much to invest in the fund. In this paper, we abstract from the decision problem of the consumer and the relationship between the fund sponsor and the management company. 6 Instead, we focus on the determination of the manager's compensation scheme by the fund management company.
Slightly abusing terminology, we call the management company the investor.
The manager and the investor have preferences represented by exponential utility functions: U a (W ) = exp( aW ) and U b (W ) = exp( bW ), respectively. Throughout the paper we will use a > 0 (b > 0) to denote the manager (investor) as well as her (his) absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient. The investment opportunity set consists of two assets. A risk-free asset with gross return R and a stock with stochastic excess return x normally distributed with mean excess return > 0 and volatility . These two assets can be interpreted as the usual "timing portfolios" for the active manager: the bond and the market portfolio (or any other stochastic timing portfolio).
The investment horizon is one period. Payo¤s are expressed in units of the economy's only consumption good. All consumption takes place at the end of the period. The manager's compensation is set as a percentage of the fund's average net asset value over the period, W .
The percentage has two components: a …xed basic fee F and an incentive (performance-tied) fee. The incentive fee is calculated as a percentage 2 (0; 1] of the fund's end of the period return, possibly net of a benchmark return.
After learning the contract, the manager decides whether to accept it or not. If rejected, the manager gets her reservation value. If she accepts the contract, then she puts some (unobservable) e¤ort e > 0 in acquiring private information (not observed by the fund's investor) that comes in the form of a signal
partially correlated with the stock's excess return. The noise term has a standard normal distribution N (0; 1). For simplicity, we assume Assumption (S1) E(x ) = 0.
The higher the e¤ort the more precise the manager's timing information. Conditional on the manager's e¤ort, the stock's excess return is normally distributed with conditional mean return E(xjy) = +ey 1+e and conditional precision Var 1 (xjy) = 
Unconstrained Portfolio Choice
Based on the conditional moments, the manager makes her optimal portfolio decision: she will invest a percentage (y) in the stock and the remaining 1 (y) in the risk-free bond. Therefore, the portfolio's return will be R p = R + x. De…ne the benchmark's return as R h = R + hx with h as the benchmark's policy weight: the proportion in the benchmark portfolio invested in the risky stock. The portfolio's net return is given by R p R h = x with = h, the net (over the benchmark) investment in the risky stock. If h = 0, the benchmarked return is R p R h = x, the excess return. Since the risk-free return is a constant, from the point of view of the manager, this case is equivalent to no benchmarking. Notice that h can be also interpreted as a the benchmark's beta on the market portfolio.
Given a contract (F; ; h), the conditional end-of-the-period wealth is given as a percentage ' a , for the manager, and ' b , for the investor, of the fund's net asset value, W :
with = (y) and x = x(y), functions of the signal realization y. If the manager chooses the benchmark portfolio as her optimal portfolio then = 0; the manager receives no incentive fee (only the …xed fee F ) and the investor's payo¤ is the benchmark's return net of the …xed fee. 8
After these de…nitions, the conditional utility function for the manager and the investor can be expressed, respectively, as 9
In this setting, the Arrow-Pratt risk premium for the manager will be, W a W 2 2 2 . Thus, a W represents the manager's relative risk aversion coe¢ cient. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we normalize W = 1.
We shall proceed backwards. First, we will obtain the optimal portfolio choice . Then, after recovering the manager's indirect utility function, we will tackle the manager's e¤ort decision.
The unconstrained manager's optimal net portfolio solves
8 Sometimes the benchmark may include a minimum excess return > 0 such that R h = R + + hx. Notice that this is equivalent to de…ne F = F 0 in equations (1) and (2). Solving for F and , F 0 is obtained as a function of . 9 Notice that, since V is homogenous of degree one with respect to D, we can always write aV (D 0 ; e) = V (D; e) with D = aD 0 . Hence the parameter D is a (increasing) function of the manager's risk aversion among other factors.
which yields the optimal portfolio
The manager's optimal portfolio has three components: the benchmark's investment in the risky stock, h; the unconditional optimal risk-return trade-o¤, a 2 and, depending on the manager's signal y and her e¤ort expenditure, e, the timing portfolio, ey a 2 . Replacing (y) in the manager's expected utility function and integrating over the signal y we obtain the manager's (unconditional) expected utility:
with g(e) = 1 1+e
1=2
. At the optimum, the e¤ort marginal utility must be equal (…rst-order condition) to its marginal disutility:
We call this solution the second best e¤ ort. 10 Assumptions (S2) and (S3) guarantee that the necessary condition (5) is also su¢ cient for optimality. Clearly, the manager's second best e¤ort choice (hence the quality of her private information) is independent of the benchmark's composition, h. This is the same result as in Admati and P ‡eiderer (1997) . E¤ort only depends on the manager's disutility coe¢ cient, D.
Constrained Portfolio Choice
We now introduce the main theoretical contribution of the paper. Assume that the manager is constrained in her portfolio choice in that she cannot short-sell or purchase on margin. Let m 1 denote the maximum trade on margin the manager is allowed: m = 1 means that the manager is not allowed to purchase the risky stock on margin; for any m > 1 the manager can borrow and invest in the risky stock up to m 1 dollars per dollar of the fund's current net asset value. Let s 0 denote the short-selling limit: s = 0 means that the manager cannot sell short the risky stock; for any s > 0 the manager can short up to s dollars per dollar of the fund's current net asset value. According to the SEC regulation, the maximum initial margin for leveraged positions is 50%, which implies that m 2 and s 1. 11 In terms of the manager's portfolio choice problem, this implies m s or, equivalently, m h (h + s).
The manager then solves the following constrained problem the interior solution follows: (y) = +ey a 2 . Alternatively, there are two possible corner solutions: …rst, if the short-selling limit is binding, m = 0 and s = E(xjy) + a (h + s)Var(xjy) < 0. In such a case, = (h + s). In the second corner solution, the margin purchase bound is hit:
Solving for the optimal portfolio (y) as a function of the signal realization we obtain that, in the case of no timing ability (e = 0), = h + a 2 provided s + a 2 h m a 2 .
For the case when e > 0 we obtain:
We call
the leverage ratios. These ratios represent the net (relative to the benchmark) maximum leverage from selling short (h + s) or trading at margin (m h) as a proportion of the manager's optimal unconstrained portfolio when e = 0 and h = 0.
Looking at the way the leverage ratios change with benchmarking, we observe that
Moreover, given the (risk-adjusted) market premium
increases (decreases) with the manager's relative risk aversion a .
Equation (6) shows how the constraints and benchmarking interact to provide incentives for e¤ort expenditure. To see the intuition, let us focus …rst on the short-selling constraint. Let us assume for the moment that there exist no limit to margin purchases (m ! 1) and that no short position can be taken (s = 0). Under these assumptions, and after exerting e¤ort e, the manager receives a signal y and makes her optimal portfolio choice:
with L s = 1 + h a 2
1 . When h = 0, all signals y < e lead to short-selling. Imagine now that the manager is o¤ered a benchmarked contract, with h > 0 the benchmark's proportion invested in the risky stock. In this case, the short-selling bound is only hit for smaller signals y < e L s . In general, increasing h leads to a "wider range" of implementable signals relative to the case of no benchmarking (h = 0). Since the e¤ort decision is taken prior to the signal realization, the fact that more signals are implementable under benchmarking (h > 0) increases the marginal expected utility of e¤ort. The size of this incremental area grows with ha . Hence, we expect the impact of benchmarking to be relatively higher for more risk averse investors.
Alternatively, assume there is no benchmarking (h = 0) but the short-selling limit is expanded from s = 0 to s = h. Figure 1 shows that, ceteris paribus, the e¤ort choice of the manager will coincide with the e¤ort put under benchmarking: given that s = 0, benchmarking the manager's portfolio return (h > 0) is, in terms of e¤ort inducement, equivalent to relaxing the short-selling bound from 0 to h. In other words, in the absence of margin purchase constraints, the manager's e¤ort depends on s + h; benchmarking the manager's performance and relaxing her short-selling constraints are perfect substitutes for e¤ ort inducement. The higher s the lower the marginal expected utility of e¤ort induced by benchmarking. In the limit, when the short-selling bounds vanish (s ! 1), we converge to the unconstrained scenario in Section 3.1 where benchmarking was shown to be irrelevant for the manager's e¤ort decision.
Let us focus now on the margin purchase constraint. Assume s ! 1 and m = 1. This implies that the manager can short any amount but cannot trade on margin: for "very good" signals the manager can only invest up to 100% of the fund's net asset value in the risky stock.
Her optimal portfolio (as a function of the signal) will be: would increase the manager's e¤ort: signals that were not implementable under benchmarking become now feasible. Symmetrically to the short-selling constraint, the expected impact on e¤ort expenditure would be analogous if benchmarking were not removed (h > 0) and the constraint on margin purchases made looser: from m = 1 to m = 1 + h. Therefore, in the absence of short selling constraints, the manager's e¤ort depends on m h: benchmarking the manager and tightening the margin purchase constraint are perfect substitutes for the manager's e¤ort (dis)incentive. Again, the impact of benchmarking increases, in absolute terms, with the manager's relative risk aversion, a . In the limit, when the manager faces no margin purchase constraint (m ! 1) the benchmark composition is irrelevant for the manager's e¤ort decision.
In summary, by modifying the benchmark portfolio composition we observe two opposing e¤ects: for the short selling constrained manager, increasing the benchmark's percentage invested in the risky stock (h) induces the manager to put more e¤ort. In contrast, for the manager constrained in her ability to purchases at margin, increasing that percentage lowers the e¤ort incentives. Thus, when (as for most mutual fund managers) both short selling and margin purchase are constrained, the trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects yields the e¤ ort maximizing benchmark. This is the question we investigate in the next section.
The e¤ort maximizing benchmark
To address the question of what is the composition of the e¤ort maximizing benchmark we proceed as follows. Proposition 1 introduces the manager's unconditional expected utility under short selling (0 s < 1) and margin purchase (1 m < 1) constraints for all possible values of h in the real line. In Proposition 2 we show that Assumptions (S2)-(S4) are su¢ cient for the existence of a continuous and di¤erentiable e¤ort function, e(h), that yields a unique e¤ort choice for each value of h. The function attains a global maximum at h = m s 2 a 2 : Before introducing the constrained manager's unconditional expected utility we need some notation. Let ( ) denote the cumulative probability function of a Chi-square variable with one degree of freedom:
Proposition 1 Given the …nite portfolio constraints s 0 and m 1, the risk-averse man-
Equations (7), (8) and (9) are weighted sums of the manager's unconstrained expected utility (4), independent of h, and her expected utility function when the portfolio hits either the short-
, or the margin purchase bound, exp
. When the manager is constrained, the benchmark's composition (i.e., the value of the parameter h)
a¤ects the quality of the timing signal through the e¤ort choice.
is decreasing with respect to e.
Notice that functions g(e; L s ; L m ) and g e (e; L s ; L m ) are symmetric with respect to h around h = m s 2 a 2 , the center of the interval [ (s + a 2 ); m a 2 ]. To see this, let represent the deviation in the benchmark portfolio's percentage invested in the risky asset above ( > 0)
Replacing the later equality in the functions g and g e the symmetry is proved.
We call e T B the third best e¤ ort that maximizes the constrained manager's expected utility function in Proposition 1:
From (10) it is obvious that, unlike in the unconstrained scenario, the manager's optimal e¤ort depends on h (through L s and L m ). We want to study how the third best e¤ort changes with h: In particular, does there exists an e¤ort maximizing benchmark?
The following proposition presents general conditions on the e¤ort disutility function and the range of the benchmark parameter h for which there exists a well behaved e¤ort function, that is, a function that yields, for each benchmark portfolio h, the utility maximizing third best e¤ort (10). More importantly, the same conditions are shown to be su¢ cient for the existence of a benchmark portfolio h that elicits the highest e¤ort from the manager. 
Corollary 2 Assume (S2)-(S4) hold. Provided it exists, the e¤ ort function e(h) is increasing in h for all h < (s + a 2 ) and decreasing in h for all h > m a 2 . Moreover, the e¤ ort function is symmetric in h around h , i.e., e(h + ) = e(h ) for all 2 <.
From proposition 2 and corollary 2, it is clear that the manager's e¤ort function attains a global maximum at h = m s 2 a 2 . The intuition for this result is as follows: on the one hand, increasing benchmarking (i.e., higher h) lowers the likelihood of hitting the short selling constraint; on the other hand, it increases the probability of hitting the margin purchase constraint. The e¤ect of decreasing benchmarking (i.e. lower h) is just symmetric. The trade-o¤ of these two opposite e¤ects yields the e¤ort-maximizing value of the benchmark composition, h .
In other words, the benchmark portfolio h makes the manager, in expected terms, indi¤ erent between hitting either constraint (short selling and margin purchase).
This intuition is illustrated in …gure 2. Assume …rst that the investor himself has to take the portfolio decision. The investor is constrained. For instance, 0 1 (zero leverage). If the benchmark coincides with the risk free asset (h = 0), the investor will chose the tangent portfolio on the "absolute" capital market line that maximizes his expected utility. Notice that the slope of the capital market line coincides with the market Sharpe ratio, = . His preferences are represented by the indi¤erence curve U ( ). In the example, his optimal portfolio portfolio holds less than 50% in the market. If the investor were given a benchmark h > 0 then he will choose a tangent portfolio = h in the "relative"capital market line that trades o¤ excess expected return against tracking error standard deviation, . Notice that given the portfolio constraints, for h = h the investor's optimal unconditional portfolio is equidistant from either boundary. The investor, by assumption, has no private information, neither the technology to acquire it. Therefore, the only implication of benchmarking would be a scaling of the optimal portfolio up to = 0:5. The Information Ratio (excess return over the benchmark relative to the portfolio tracking error's volatility) does not change and remains equal to the Sharpe Ratio. 12 1 2 For a given signal y, the Information Ratio is de…ned as IR(y) = E( (y)xjy) SD( (y)xjy)
. The unconditional Information
Ratio will be IR(e) = R
dF (y) > p 1 + e, with F ( ) the normal distribution function for the signal y. Figure 3 shows the Information Ratio as a function of the signal y and given e¤ort e. Notice that, when e = 0, the Information Ratio coincides with the Sharpe Ratio for all signal y. When e increases the Assume now that the decision is taken by the manager, whom, in principal, has the ability to increase the precision of her private signal by putting some e¤ort. The manager's e¤ort choice maximizes her unconditional expected utility before receiving the signal. The benchmark composition h allows, ex-ante, more extreme signals to be implemented, increasing e¤ort's marginal utility and, ultimately, the manager's e¤ort choice. Therefore, the manager's expected Information Ratio (ie, averaging across all possible signals) changes relative to that of the the uninformed investors: it becomes higher than p 1 + e. In fact, Proposition 2 shows that the benchmark h maximizes e¤ort expenditure and, therefore, the Information Ratio.Assuming, for simplicity, that the manager and the investor have the same risk aversion, the manager's optimal portfolio would be higher than 50%. 13 Now we show that, for any given contract, the e¤ort choice for the constrained manager is smaller than for the unconstrained manager.
Corollary 3 For any given contract (F; ; h) and …nite manager's risk aversion, a, the constrained manager's third best e¤ ort e T B < e SB . In the limit, when the portfolio constraints vanish, the third best e¤ ort and the second best e¤ ort coincide.
We conclude this section by studying two especial cases of the more general constrained problem. As illustrated in the examples in section 3.2, when the manager is only short selling constrained (i.e., unlimited margin purchases), increasing the benchmark investment in the risky asset, h, gives the manager more incentives to put higher e¤ort. In the case of unlimited short selling and constrained margin purchases, the result is symmetric: e¤ort decreases with h. In either case, there is no optimal benchmark composition. The following corollary summarizes these …ndings.
Corollary 4 When the manager can purchase at margin with no limit but faces a short selling bound, the e¤ ort function is monotonous increasing in h. Symmetrically, when the manager can sell short with no restriction but faces limited margin purchase, the e¤ ort function is monotonous decreasing with h.
The principal' s problem
The investor's optimal contract (F; ; h) maximizes his expected utility subject to the manager's incentive compatibility and participation constraints. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we normalize the manager's reservation value to exp( (1=2) 2 = 2 ). For a given contract (F; ; h), the manager's (conditional) wealth is given as a percentage, equation (2), of the fund's net asset value.
slope increases in absolute value, making the Information Ratio higher for all signal y. As e ! 1, in the limit, the Information Ratio also tends to in…nity. For y = the Information Ratio becomes p 1 + e. Averaging across y, the expected Information Ratio is higher than p 1 + e since for all y < e ; the Information Ratio "bounces back:" the manger would short the risky asset.
1 3 As shown in …gure 3 the Information Ratio increases with the manager's e¤ort for all signal y. Averaging across signals, therefore, we obtain that the manager's expected Information Ratio (i.e., the slope in Figure 2 ) increases with e¤ort and given the contract (F; ) reaches a maximum at h . Notice that, at this point, we are not solving the investor's optimal contract. Hence, no conclusion is drawn on . For an easier interpretation, assume = 1, such that the manager receives all the relative performance surplus.
The constrained manager, after accepting the contract, decides how much e¤ort to exert.
Subsequently, she receives the signal y and invests a proportion (y) as in (6) in the risky asset.
and T ( ) = (2 t( ))t( ). The investor's expected utility is introduced in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let a eb > 0 and a +eb (1 (2 t( ))) > 0. Given the portfolio constraints s 0 and m 1, the expected utility of the risk-averse investor is
The investor must choose the optimal linear contract, which includes the optimal …xed and incentive fees, F and , respectively, and the optimal benchmark, h, subject to the participation
neither e¤ort nor h or are a function of F . This, along with the fact that the left-hand side is increasing in F and the investor's utility is decreasing in F , implies that under the optimal contract the participation constraint is binding. So, the investor's expected utility can be expressed a function of the contract ( ; h), and the manager's level of e¤ort, e:
We want to study how the portfolio constraints and the presence of moral hazard a¤ect the investor's optimal contract. We distinguish four cases depending on whether the manager's e¤ort is publicly observable or not (moral hazard) and whether the manager is constrained or unconstrained in her portfolio choice.
Assume …rst that the manager's portfolio is unconstrained. If the manager's e¤ort decision is observable, the investor maximizes his expected utility with respect to , h and e¤ort. We call this the …rst best scenario. We show then that the optimal contract is given by the …rst best incentive fee, F B = b=(a + b), and zero benchmarking, h = 0. The function f (e; L s ; L m ) becomes g(e). The investor chooses the …rst best e¤ort level, e F B , that solves
This results in the …rst order condition:
:
Notice that the higher the manager's risk aversion (relative to the investor's risk aversion), a=b, the lower the optimal incentive fee, F B , and, consequently, the higher the investor's participation in the fund's return, 1 F B . Hence, the investor becomes more interested in the manager's signal precision: the marginal utility of e¤ort increases and so does e F B . 14 In the case when the manager's e¤ort decision is not observable, the investor's problem consists in …nding the optimal split that maximizes (11) subject to the manager's optimal e¤ort condition. Assume …rst that there exit no portfolio constraints. We call this scenario the second best. As shown in section 3.1, the manager's second best e¤ort, e SB , is independent of and h.
This result is consistent with Stoughton (1993) and Admati and P ‡eiderer (1997) . The investor will choose the same contract than in the …rst best case: ( F B ; 0). The second best e¤ort satis…es the optimality condition (5):
Comparing the later two conditions it is obvious that e F B > e SB for all a=b > 0. That is, the second best e¤ort coincides with the …rst best e¤ort the investor would choose himself in the limit when b ! 1 (or, a ! 0) and, consequently, F B ! 1. This would be equivalent to a swap contract between the manager (who takes all portfolio risk) and the investor (who gets, in exchange, a …xed rent, F < 0, from the manager). Notice that the manager's marginal utility of e¤ort is, in the second best case, independent of a=b, or h. Moreover, the cost (in terms of e¤ort expenditure) of moral hazard increases with a=b: the investor would want to increase the manager's e¤ort but the contract fails to induce it.
We turn now to the case in which the manager's portfolio is constrained. Assume …rst that the manager's e¤ort is observable. We show that the contract ( F B ; 0) is still optimal.
The function f (e; L s ; L m ) becomes g(e; L s (0); L m (0)). In this constrained …rst best scenario the investor chooses the constrained …rst best e¤ort level, e c , that maximizes
Notice that, as expected, portfolio constraints decrease the optimal e¤ort choice: e F B > e c F B
.
Assume now that the manager's e¤ort is not observable. We call this scenario the third best.
The manager's third best e¤ort satis…es (10). Section 3.2 shows that e¤ort is increasing in and, given , reaches an absolute maximum at h . We show that the contract ( F B ; 0) is no longer optimal. These results are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Absent any portfolio constraint, the contract ( F B ; 0) is optimal, both for the public information case as well as under moral hazard.
Under portfolio constraints and no moral hazard, the contract ( F B ; 0) is still optimal. When the e¤ ort decision is not observable by the investor and hence there exists moral hazard, the contract ( F B ; 0) is suboptimal.
The important implication of this proposition is that, to justify a benchmark di¤erent from the risk-free asset (or, in its absence, the minimum variance portfolio), both moral hazard and portfolio constraints must coexist. The following We are interested in studying the optimal contract in the third best scenario, ( T B ; h T B ). In spite of the simpli…cations, we cannot solve analytically for the general optimal contract under moral hazard and portfolio constraints. In the next section we present some numerical results.
A numerical solution of the third best contract
We propose the function V (e) = D 2 e 2 with disutility parameter D = 1. Throughout the numerical analysis, we take the market excess return = 6% and the market volatility = 18%, both on an annual basis. The principal's absolute risk aversion is b = 4. The manager's absolute risk aversion parameter takes values a = f4; 8; 20g. We consider di¤erent degrees of portfolio constraints: s = 0 and m = 1 is the zero leverage base-case. We then allow for short selling (s = 1 and s = 2) and margin purchases (m = 2 and m = 3). For each combination (a; b) and (m; s) we calculate the manager's e¤ort and the investor's expected utility (11) for a grid of values for and h around the …rst best contract ( F B (a; b) ; 0). changes from 70% F B (a; b) to 130% F B (a; b), at intervals of length 5% F B (a; b). Likewise, h changes from 30% to 30% at intervals of length 5%. In the absence of moral hazard, for each contract ( ; h) the manager puts the constrained …rst best e¤ort that maximizes the investor's expected utility in (11). Under moral hazard, for each contract ( ; h) the manager puts the third best e¤ort in (10). Figure 4 introduces the base case under total constraints: m = 1 and s = 0 and risk aversion coe¢ cients a = 4 and a = 8. Two scenarios are considered: Panel A presents the optimal contract in the absence of moral hazard (the manager's e¤ort decision is publicly observable), i.e., the constrained …rst best scenario; Panel B represents the optimal contract under moral hazard, i.e., the third best scenario. The investors expected utility is concave in and h. In Panel A, we observe that, as predicted in proposition 4, in the absence of moral hazard, the investor's maximum expected utility is attained at the …rst best contract ( F B ; 0) with zero benchmarking.
The …gures in Panel B con…rm the prediction in proposition 4: the …rst best contract is no longer optimal in the presence of moral hazard. In concrete, the incentive fee increases from 50% to 60% for a = 4; from 33% to 45% for a = 8. The benchmark becomes more risky: the percentage invested in the market portfolio rises from zero to 10% for a = 4 and to 15% for a = 8. Table 1 summarizes the optimal contracts ( ; h) under moral hazard and di¤erent levels of portfolio constraints. Let us concentrate …rst in the totally constrained scenario, that is, m = 1 and s = 0. Table 1 shows that, when the manager's risk aversion a increases, the optimal incentive fee decreases (as it would be expected) although it is always higher than in the …rst base case. Concretely, T B is, respectively, 20% (a = 4), 35% (a = 8) and 65% (a = 20) higher than the …rst best F B . Therefore, relative to the unconstrained case, the percentage increase in the contract's optimal incentive fee grows with the manager's risk aversion. Looking now at the benchmark composition, we observe that h increases from zero to 10% (a = 4), 15% (a = 8) and 20%(a = 20). These results suggest that the investor has more incentives to alter the …rst best contract under portfolio constraints (by increasing both the incentive fee, , and h) when the manager is more risk averse. This is in agreement with the analytical results in section 5. We showed then that the investor's utility loss in the unconstrained, second best scenario increased relative to the …rst best case, with the manager's risk aversion. The argument is the following: the investor becomes more focussed on the manager's ability (e¤ort) as he retains a larger proportion of the portfolio output ( F B decreases with a=b). In the absence of portfolio constraints, the second best contract (the same as the …rst best) fails to induce higher e¤ort on the manager. However, in the presence of portfolio constraints, both the incentive fee and the benchmark composition become relevant in reducing the ine¢ ciency caused by the moral hazard problem and the portfolio constraints. Additionally, their e¢ ciency increases with the manager's risk aversion.
Looking now at the e¤ect of relaxing the portfolio constraints we observe the following.
Holding the short selling limit, s, constant and increasing m results in a lower incentive fee, T B , and a higher optimal benchmark, h T B . On the other hand, holding the margin purchase constraint constant and increasing the short selling constraint implies both a lower T B and h T B .
The e¤ect on the benchmark coincides with the predictions of Corollary 4. Notice that when m = 3, s = 2 and a = 20, the optimal third best contract coincides with the unconstrained, second best contract (16; 0).
We are interested now in analyzing the implications of the optimal contract on the manager's e¤ort choice and the investors welfare. As a measure of the later we use the investor's certainly equivalent wealth (CEW). 15 To estimate the e¤ect of the optimal contract on the manager's e¤ort expenditure, we can look at Table 2 . Panel A in this table shows the third best e¤ort for each optimal contract in Table 1. Recall that e¤ort can be interpreted as the percentage net increase in precision induced by the manager's private information. Concentrating on the constrained setting (m = 1 and s = 0), we observe that the manager's e¤ort increases with her risk aversion, from 16% (a = 4) to 26% (a = 20). As a benchmark, the table also reports the unconstrained e¤ort levels without (…rst best) and with (second best) information asymmetry and moral hazard: the …rst best e¤ort is 61.8% (a = 4), 82.29% (a = 8), 130.28% (a = 20), respectively. The second best e¤ort is 36.63%, independently of a. Therefore, even when the manager is totally constrained, when properly compensated, her e¤ort exertion (and the corresponding timing 1 5 Given the investor's utility function, U b (W ) = exp( bW ), the certainty equivalent wealth of the expected utility u is given by the inverse of this function, C(u) = ln( u)=b. Clearly, for any two values of the investor's expected utility, u1 and u2, u1 > u2 if and only if C(u1) > C(u2). In concrete, given equation (11), for a given expected utility value u = exp( bR (1=2) 2 = 2 + (b=a)V (D; e)) g(e; Ls; Lm) b=a f (e; Ls; Lm). Then, C(u) R = (1=2b) 2 = 2 (1=a)(V (D; e) + lng(e; Ls; Lm)) (1=b)lnf (e; Ls; Lm). We call CEW (u) = C(u) R, the excess risk-free return (above the bond's return, R) that leaves the investor indi¤erent. ability) can be quite substantial and increasing in the manager's risk aversion.
Panel B shows, for every contract and portfolio constraint, the percentage change in the third best optimal e¤ort in Panel A with respect to the e¤ort the manager would exert if compensated with the suboptimal …rst best contract, ( F B ; 0). The ine¢ ciency caused by a suboptimal compensation, both in terms of the incentive fee and the benchmark composition can be very substantial: the manager's e¤ort (hence, timing ability) would be reduced by almost 30% in the case of a = 20. When portfolio constraints are relaxed, the loss in e¤ort expenditure from the suboptimal contract decreases.
In order to disentangle the e¤ect of h and on e¤ort expenditure, Figure 5 presents the percentage variation in e¤ort, relative to the third best, when we change the benchmark composition h holding constant the optimal third best incentive fee, T B , in Table 2 . For a = 4, the investor could increase the manager's e¤ort by 5% reducing the benchmark's investment in the risky asset from h T B = 10% to h = 27:16%. 16 This would be, however, suboptimal since the investor's certainty equivalent wealth would decrease from 2.67% down to 1.97%. When a = 20, the third best optimal benchmark, h = 20%, is very close to h = 16:33%. By moving down to h the manager's e¤ort barely increases by 0.1%. This is an interesting implication of our model: depending of the manager's risk aversion, the investor may optimally forgo higher e¤ort inducement (timing ability) on the manager by moving away from the highest e¤ort benchmark h . The intuition behind this result lays on the balance between the incentives for e¤ort expenditure (which increases the investor's expected utility) and the distortion that benchmarking introduces by leading the manager to a suboptimal risk-return trade-o¤ (Roll's critique to benchmarking). Only when the manager's risk aversion is high enough, the marginal utility gain from extra e¤ort expenditure compensates the investor for the higher total risk exposure induced by a larger h.
We turn now into the e¤ects of changing the contract on the investor's utility (represented by his CEW). Table 3 presents the CEW loss that would result for the investor from o¤ering the manager a suboptimal …rst best contract ( F B ; 0). The …gures could be interpreted as the annual excess risk-free return (above the bond's return, R) that would compensate the investor for the loss in expected utility from the suboptimal …rst best contract. Notice that the loss is higher the more constrained the manager is and the larger her risk aversion, a. In fact, when s = 2 and m = 3 the optimal third best contract for a manager with risk aversion coe¢ cient a = 20 is, according to Table 1 , (16; 0), the same as the …rst best contract. Consequently, the CEW loss is zero. In contrast, when the same manager is fully constrained, the CEW loss increases above 4:5%.
We calculate the investor's CEW loss relative to the optimal third best contract when we give the manager the optimal third best incentive fee, F B and change the benchmark composition h. Figure 6 illustrates this loss for three di¤erent values of a, the manager's risk aversion. The CEW loss increases with the manager's risk aversion and is symmetric around h T B ; that is, overbenchmarking as well as underbenchmarking decrease the investors welfare. For a = 20 the percentages of CEW loss can be higher than 4% when h goes beyond 40%.
Summarizing the results from this section, the numerical solution of the investor's optimal contract and the sensitivity analysis performed on the benchmark choice, we conclude that:
1. When the manager is fully constraint (neither selling short nor purchasing at margin are allowed), choosing the optimal benchmark has quantitatively important implications for the manager's timing ability and the investor's welfare. It is also optimal to increase (relative to the unconstrained case) the manager's incentive fee. The ine¢ ciency in terms of e¤ort expenditure (for the manager) and welfare (for the investor) from a suboptimal contract increase with the manager's risk aversion.
2. When the manager is constrained, it is not necessarily optimal for the investor to maximize the portfolio's Information Ratio.
3. When portfolio constraints are relaxed, the optimal benchmark changes accordingly: it increases (decreases) when, ceteris paribus, the margin purchase (short selling) constraint is relaxed. In any case, holding the manager's risk aversion constant, the optimal incentive fee decreases towards the …rst best incentive fee. For the investor, when either constraint is relaxed (holding the other), the e¢ ciency cost of choosing the wrong benchmark decreases although it remains sizeable for the case of risk averse managers.
In brief, our model predicts that if investors and managers are aware of the impact of benchmarking and its interactions with portfolio constraints, there should exist a variation in benchmarking and e¤ort across funds depending on the portfolio constraints placed on the manager. The following table summarizes our main testable implications:
Constrained e T B > e e T B = e
Conclusions
This paper investigates the e¤ort inducement incentives of (potentially benchmarked) linear incentive fee contracts. Incentives arise explicitly via the compensation of the manager. The investor has to decide simultaneously the incentive fee (the manager's participation in the delegated portfolio's return) and the benchmark composition.
The contribution of our paper to the literature on management compensation comes from the fact that we incorporate portfolio constraints in our model. These constraints are exogenous in our model and could be motivated by regulation or, as suggested by Almazan et al (2004) , as alternative monitoring mechanism in a broader equilibrium model.
Under portfolio constraints and moral hazard, our model predicts that a portfolio manager should be o¤ered an incentive fee benchmarked against a portfolio that combines the risky market portfolio and the risky asset. Numerical exercises suggest that, in contrast with the predictions from the unconstrained setting in Adamati and P ‡eiderer (1997), the risk-free asset is not the optimal benchmark. When portfolio constraints are removed, the model predicts that the manager's e¤ort is unrelated to the incentive fee and the benchmark composition, a well-known result in the literature.
These predictions are consistent with the prevalence of absolute return (non-benchmarked) compensation schemes among hedge fund managers, arguably much less constrained than mutual fund managers. Moreover, it o¤ers a theoretical foundation for the observed out-performance of mutual funds who o¤er incentive fee compensation as documented by Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) . The model implies new empirically testable implications.
Multiplying the previous expression by the density function of the signal variable, y, we obtain:
otherwise. Integrating over k and given the de…nition of ( ), the unconditional utility function follows. QED
Proof of Corollary 1
By de…nition, jL m j > jL s j for all 1 < h < s + a 2 such that
QED

Proof of Proposition 2
Let us de…ne
The function J 2 C 1 for all (e; h). The third best e¤ort in (10) satis…es:
The implicit function theorem allows us to solve "locally"the equation; that is, for all (ê;ĥ) that satisfy (A1) and (A2), e¤ort e can be expressed as a function of h in a neighborhood of (ê;ĥ).
More formally: for all (ê;ĥ) that satisfy (A1) and (A2) there exists a function e(h) 2 C 1 and an open ball B(ĥ), such that e(ĥ) = e T B and J (e(h); L s ; L m ) = 0 for all h 2 B(ĥ).
Taking the derivative of J (e T B ; L s ; L m ) with respect to h: 17
Taking the second derivative of (8) with respect to e:
Condition (A2) 
for all h 2 <.
Let us de…ne the gamma function (u) = R 1 0 t u 1 exp( t)dt for u > 0. The incomplete gamma function is given by (u;
Therefore, e h (h) > 0 for all s + a 2 h < h and e h (h) < 0 for all h < h m a 2 ;
e h (h ) = 0. Since the function e(h) is continuous and di¤erentiable, it follows that h is a local maximum in the interval s + a 2 ; m a 2 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2
Let h < s + a 2 . Then, L s < 0 and L m > 0 and jL s j < jL m j. From (7),
> 0:
follows that e h (h) < 0 for all h > m a 2 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3
Let h 2 s + a 2 ; m a 2 . We re-write the function J (e; L s ; L m ) as:
Evaluating this function at the second best e¤ort and given (5) we obtain
This implies that E e U a (' a (e SB )) = exp( (1=2) 2 = 2 aF +V (D; e SB )) J (e SB ; L s ; L m ) <
0:
Therefore, for the constrained manager, the marginal utility of e¤ort at e SB is negative. Since e T B is unique and the function is continuous in e, given conditions (A1) and (A2), it follows that e SB > e T B for all h 2 s + a 2 ; m a 2 . Given Corollary 2 this result holds for all h 2 <. Next we show that
Re-writing (A7) and applying L'Hôpital's rule we get:
Therefore, given (A6) and (A7), J (e SB ; L s ; L m ) tends to zero when m and s tend to in…nity.
In the limit, the constrained manager's marginal expected utility of e¤ort becomes zero at e SB , E e U a (' a (e SB )) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4
Lemma 1 For all 0 < x < 1,
Proof: See Lemma 1 in Gómez and Sharma (2006) Let m ! 1 and 0
Therefore, g h (e; L s ) < 0 for all h 2 <. From (A3), g eh (e; L s ) < 0 for all h 2 <. Thus, e h (h) > 0 for all h 2 <. Following the same procedure, it is trivial to show that e h (h) < 0 for all h 2 < when s ! 1 and 1 m < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Replacing (6) in the investor's utility function:
Multiplying the previous expression by the density function of the signal variable y, we obtain:
Integrating over k and given the de…nition of ( ), the unconditional utility function becomes (1 + Lm) 1 + e 1+e 
if s a +eb(1 )(2 t( )) a +eb(1 (2 t( ))) (1 + Lm) 1 e 1+e bh(t( ) 1) (1 + Lm) 1 + e 1+e
Proof of Proposition 4
We …rst need some partial derivatives of function f and g with respect to and h. Taking the derivative of (A8) with respect to h and evaluating it at the contract ( F B ; 0) yields:
Taking the derivative of (A8) with respect to and evaluating it at the contract ( F B ; 0) we obtain:
Equation (A4) at ( F B ; 0) can be rewritten as follows:
Assume …rst that the manager's e¤ort choice is publicly observable. The investor chooses the contract ( ; h) that satis…es the …rst order optimality condition:
for i = f ; hg. We distinguish two cases: with and without portfolio constraints.
Without portfolio constraints, s ! 1 and m ! 1. The manager's expected utility (4) is independent of and h. Given (A7) and the partial derivatives for f , it follows immediately that, lim s;m!1 f i (e; L s ; L m j F B ; 0) = 0; for i = f ; hg. Hence, the contract ( F B ; 0) is optimal.
With portfolio constraints, notice …rst that g(e; L s ; L m j F B ; 0) = f (e; L s ; L m j F B ; 0). Evaluating the optimality condition at ( F B ; 0) and given the partial derivatives for f and g, it follows that the contract ( F B ; 0) satis…es the …rst order optimality condition in the absence of moral hazard.
We turn now to the case of moral hazard. Without portfolio constraints (second best scenario), the manager's e¤ort (5) is independent of and h. Hence, the contract ( F B ; 0) is optimal. Under portfolio constraints (third best scenario), the third best e¤ort, e T B , is a function of and h. The …rst order condition for optimality requires that Figure 1: We assume that short-selling is totally forbidden (s = 0) and there is no limit to margin purchase (m ! 1). For simplicity, let = 1. After putting e¤ort e the manager receives a signal y and makes her optimal portfolio . When h = 0 (bottom portfolio line), all signals y < e lead to short-selling. When h > 0 (upper portfolio line), the short-selling bound is hit for signals y < e L s : In both cases, the region of these non-implementable portfolios is marked by the thick line. Under benchmarking (h > 0) there is an incremental area for implementable signals relative to the case of no benchmarking. The size of this area, ha e= 2 ; increases with benchmarking (h) and the manager's risk aversion (a); it has probability mass equal to the shaded area in the density function plot.
Figure 2: Portfolio choice is constrained. The "absolute" capital market line represents the portfolio choice problem of an uninformed investor (e = 0) that maximizes his expected utility. Notice that the slope of the capital market line coincides with the market Sharpe ratio, = . His preferences are represented by the indi¤erence curve U ( ). In the example, his optimal portfolio portfolio holds less than 50% in the market. If the investor were given a benchmark h > 0 then he will choose a tangent portfolio = h in the "relative" capital market line that trades o¤ excess expected return against tracking error standard deviation, . Notice that given the portfolio constraints, for h = h the investor's optimal unconditional portfolio is equidistant from either boundary. The Information Ratio (excess return over the benchmark relative to the portfolio tracking error's volatility) does not change and it is equal to the Sharpe Ratio. If the portfolio decision is taken by a manager with the ability to increase the precision of her private signal by putting some e¤ort then, moving h from zero to h results in the highest e¤ort expenditure for the constrained manager. The Information Ratio (the slope) increases to IR(e) > ( = ) p 1 + e. The manager's optimal portfolio would be higher than 50% (the tangency fortfolio for U ( )).
Figure 3: This …gure represents the Information Ratio as a function of the signal y and given e¤ort e. Notice that, when e = 0, the Information Ratio coincides with the Sharpe Ratio for all signal y. When e increases the slope increases in absolute value, making the Information Ratio higher for all signal y. As e ! 1, in the limit, the Information ratio also tends to in…nity. For y = the Information Ratio becomes p 1 + e. Averaging across y, the expected Information Ratio is higher than p 1 + e since for all y < e ; the Information Ratio "bounces back:" the manger would short the risky asset. Figure 5: Each …gure represents the percentage variation in e¤ort, relative to the third best, when we change the benchmark composition h holding constant the optimal third best incentive fee, T B , for values of a = 4, a = 8 and a = 20, respectively. The investor's risk aversion is b = 4. The manager is fully constrained: m = 1 and s = 0. h is the e¤ort maximizing benchmark composition in the manager's partial equilibrium problem. h T B is the third best optimal benchmark composition. For a = 20, the third best optimal benchmark, h T B = 20%,and h = 16:33%. Figure 6 : Each …gure represents the percentage loss in certainty equivalent wealth (CEW), relative to the third best, when we change the benchmark composition h holding constant the optimal third best incentive fee, T B , for values of a = 4, a = 8 and a = 20, respectively. The investor's risk aversion is b = 4. The manager is fully constrained: m = 1 and s = 0. h T B is the third best optimal benchmark composition. 
